This is a discussion of Philippa Foot’s account of Good-For, Good-As, The Good Of, and related notions — especially as applied to the case of living things. Some issues discussed: Is it always good for (i.e. beneficial for) an organism to live its naturally good life? How does our thinking about benefit and harm in plants and non-human animals carry over (or not) to our thinking about benefit, harm, and happiness for human beings? This chapter appeared in a volume on Foot edited by John Hacker-Wright.
In a series of influential essays, Sharon Street has argued, on the basis of Darwinian considerations, that normative realism leads to skepticism about moral knowledge. I argue that if we begin with the account of moral knowledge provided by Aristotelian naturalism, then we can offer a satisfactory realist response to Street’s argument, and that Aristotelian naturalism can avoid challenges facing other realist responses. I first explain Street’s evolutionary argument and three of the most prominent realist responses, and I identify challenges to each of those responses. I then develop an Aristotelian response to Street. My core claim is this: Given Aristotelian naturalism’s account of moral truth and our knowledge of it, we can accept the influence of evolutionary processes on our moral beliefs, while also providing a principled, non-question-begging reason for thinking that those basic evaluative tendencies that evolution has left us with will push us toward, rather than away from, realist moral truths, so that our reliably getting things right does not require an unexplained and implausible coincidence.
Joshua Greene argues that cognitive (neuro)science matters for ethics in two ways, the “direct route” and the “indirect route.” Greene illustrates the direct route with a debunking explanation of the inclination to condemn all incest. The indirect route is an updated version of Greene’s argument that dual-process moral psychology gives support for consequentialism over deontology. I consider each of Greene’s arguments, and I argue that neither succeeds. If there is a route from cognitive (neuro)science to ethics, Greene has not found it.
In The Value of Living Well, Mark LeBar develops a position that he calls “virtue eudaimonism” (ve). ve is both a eudaimonistic theory of practical reasoning and a constructivist account of the metaphysics of value. In this essay, I will explain the core of LeBar’s view and focus on two issues, one concerning ve’s eudaimonism and the other concerning ve’s constructivism. I will argue that, as it stands, ve does not adequately address the charge of egoism, once that charge has been formulated in the strongest way. I will also argue that a substantive constructivism like ve must have considerably less explanatory power than any (successful) constructivism that appeals to a formal characterization of agency. Although my remarks are largely critical, I offer them in a spirit of sympathetic engagement with LeBar’s impressive book.
In The Second Person Standpoint, Stephen Darwall makes a new argument against consequentialism, appealing to: (a) the conceptual tie between obligation and accountability, and (b) the ‘right kind of reasons’ for holding others accountable. I argue that Darwall’s argument, as it stands, fails against indirect consequentialism, because it relies on a confusion between our being right to establish practices, and our having a right to do so. I also explore two ways of augmenting Darwall’s argument. However, while the second of these ways is more promising than the first, neither provides a convincing argument against indirect consequentialism.
The central claim of Aristotelian naturalism is that moral goodness is a kind of species-specific natural goodness. Aristotelian naturalism has recently enjoyed a resurgence in the work of philosophers such as Philippa Foot, Rosalind Hursthouse, and Michael Thompson. However, any view that takes moral goodness to be a type of natural goodness faces a challenge: Granting that moral goodness is natural goodness for human beings, why should we care about being good human beings? Given that we are rational creatures who can ‘step back’ from our nature, why should we see human nature as authoritative for us? This is the authority-of-nature challenge. In this essay, I state this challenge clearly, identify its deep motivation, and distinguish it from other criticisms of Aristotelian naturalism. I also articulate what I consider the best response, which I term the practical reason response. This response, however, exposes Aristotelian naturalism to a new criticism – that it has abandoned the naturalist claim that moral goodness is species-specific natural goodness. Thus, I argue, Aristotelian naturalists appear to face a dilemma: Either they cannot answer the authority-of-nature challenge, or in meeting the challenge they must abandon naturalism. Aristotelian naturalists might overcome this dilemma, but doing so is harder than some Aristotelians have supposed. In the final sections of the paper, I examine the difficulties in overcoming the dilemma, and I suggest ways that Aristotelians might answer the authority- of-nature challenge while preserving naturalism. This essay appeared in Philosophia.
According to one plausible interpretation, recent evidence from psychological research shows that possession of the Aristotelian virtues is very rare. Does the rarity of the virtues pose any theoretical problems for Aristotelian virtue ethics, or can virtue ethicists accept rarity while leaving their moral theory intact? Critics such as John Doris and Stephen Stich argue that a virtue ethics that embraces rarity must lose its main “competitive advantage” over other moral theories, and that rarity also leaves little role for virtue in a program of moral education. And in his recent book Character as Moral Fiction, Mark Alfano describes the Rarity Thesis as an unsatisfying “dodge” made by virtue ethicists, which requires sacrificing several components of the hard core of virtue ethics. In this paper, I consider these criticisms and I show why they are misguided. In order to do this, I first consider a series of parallels between our evaluations of virtue and our evaluations of skill, or craft. These parallels provide useful conceptual materials for assessing the significance of rarity for virtue ethics, and for demonstrating that rarity, as such, poses no theoretical problems for virtue ethics. This paper is thus both a contribution to the growing discussion of virtue’s relation to skill, and an attempt to show how that discussion can fruitfully inform the continuing debate about character, situations, and empirical psychology. This essay appeared in the Journal of Value Inquiry.
Does possessing some human virtues make it impossible for a person to possess other human virtues? Isaiah Berlin and Bernard Williams both answered “yes” to this question, and they argued that to hold otherwise – to accept the harmony of the virtues – required a blinkered and unrealistic view of “what it is to be human.” In this essay, I have two goals: 1) to show how the harmony of the virtues is best interpreted, and what is at stake in affirming or denying it, and 2) to provide a partial defense of the harmony of the virtues. More specifically, I show how the harmony of the virtues can be interpreted and defended within the kind of Aristotelian naturalism developed by philosophers such as Philippa Foot, Rosalind Hursthouse, and Michael Thompson. I argue that far from being an embarrassing liability for Aristotelianism – based in an “archaic metaphysical biology” – the harmony thesis is an interesting and plausible claim about human excellences, supported by a sophisticated account of the representation of life, and fully compatible with a realistic view of our human situation. This essay appeared in the American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly.
This paper deals with some influential objections to Aristotelian natural goodness, based on evolutionary science. I show how these objections either misunderstand the Aristotelian position, or beg the question against it in their criticisms. This paper appeared in the Journal of Moral Philosophy.
If we accept that living things may be naturally good in the Aristotelian sense, the further question remains: What is naturally good for a human being, and how do we know what belongs to human form? In this essay, I argue that the virtuous person has a grasp of human form, and her virtuous actions spring from this grasp. Moreover, moral virtue provides one with knowledge of human form that has an essentially different character than the knowledge provided by the empirical sciences: knowledge of one’s own form that comes from knowing what one ought to do. This essay appeared in Social Theory and Practice.
What’s wrong with the sophist? This essay looks at Plato’s answer to that question in the Sophist, drawing connections between the dialogue’s various definitions of the sophist. I also relate Plato’s portrayal of the sophist in this dialogue to some figures in his other works, including the Republic and Apology. The paper is forthcoming in Phoenix, a journal of the Canadian Classical Association.
It appears that one of the aims of John Rawls’ ideal of public reason is to provide people with good reason for exercising restraint on their nonpublic reasons when they are acting in the public political arena. I will argue, however, that in certain cases Rawls’ ideal of public reason is unable to provide a person with good reason for exercising such restraint, even if the person is already committed to Rawls’ ideal of public reason. Because it is plausible to believe that such cases are widespread, the issue I am raising represents a serious problem for Rawls’ account of public reason. After posing this problem, I consider potential responses on behalf of Rawls’ view, and I reply to those responses. The moral of this story, as I see it, is that the kind of duty an ideal of public reason aims to place on citizens must be more modest than Rawls supposes.
Reasonably Traditional: Self-Reference and Self-Contradiction in MacIntyre’s Account of Tradition
As essay on Alasdair MacIntyre, and his notion of tradition-based rationality, that appeared in the Journal of Religious Ethics. It is an attempt to defend MacIntyre’s account of rationality and tradition, against criticisms from people such Jeffrey Stout, Jennifer Herdt, and John Haldane.
film, music, culture, politics
I co-authored this essay with a dear friend. Its about politics, business, and the language we use to talk about both of them.
Awhile back, I wrote a piece on The Hurt Locker for The Point magazine. It’s not so much a review as a reflection on some moral and political issues that the film raises. It’s called “Wildman at Work: Natural Virtue and Civic Life in The Hurt Locker.” It can be found online here.
A friend edited this volume on Radiohead and Philosophy. I contributed a chapter that considered the band’s music in light of Aristotle’s account of tragedy and catharsis in the Poetics.
I wrote two essays on Catholic Social Thought, aimed at a non-academic audience. The first of these essays deals with concepts of private property and divine creation. It is called “All Things Come from Thee: Persons, Property, and the Gifts of Creation” and is available here.